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Abstract—Purpose: With the rapid deployment of Internet of
Things (IoT) technologies, it has been essential to address the
security and privacy issues through maintaining transparency in
data practices. The prior research focused on identifying people’s
privacy preferences in different contexts of IoT usage, and their
mental models of security threats. However, there is a dearth in
existing literature to understand the mismatch between user’s
perceptions and the actual data practices of IoT devices. Such
mismatches could lead users unknowingly sharing their private
information, exposing themselves to unanticipated privacy risks.
We aim to identify these mismatched privacy perceptions in our
work.
Methodology: We conducted a lab study with 42 participants,
where we compared participants’ perceptions with the data
practices stated in the privacy policy of 28 IoT devices from
different categories, including health & exercise, entertainment,
smart homes, toys & games, and pets.
Findings: We identified the mismatched privacy perceptions of
users in terms of data collection, sharing, protection, and storage
period. Our findings revealed the mismatches between user’s
perceptions and the data practices of IoT devices for various
types of information, including personal, contact, financial, heath,
location, media, connected device, online social media, and IoT
device usage.
Value: The findings from this study lead to our recommendations on designing simplified privacy notice by highlighting the
unexpected data practices, which in turn, would contribute to
the secure and privacy-preserving use of IoT devices.
Index Terms—IoT; User Study; Mismatched Privacy Perceptions

I. I NTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a system of interrelated
devices provided with unique identifiers and the ability to
transfer data over a network without requiring human intervention (Patel, Patel et al., 2016). The IoT devices are
becoming increasingly popular in day-to-day lives, with nearly
two-thirds of Americans owning at least one IoT connected
device (Kaplan, 2016). Despite the increasing popularity and
immense potential of IoT devices, security and privacy issues
remain as major concerns (Emami-Naeini, Dixon, Agarwal
and Cranor, 2019; Zeng, Mare and Roesner, 2017; Ziegeldorf,
Morchon and Wehrle, 2014).
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The prior study (Naeini, Bhagavatula, Habib, Degeling,
Bauer, Cranor and Sadeh, 2017) explored the privacy preferences of users in different contexts of IoT usage, where participants reported to be less comfortable with data collection
in private places as compared to public settings. The limited
technical understanding of people often contributes to their
incorrect mental model of privacy and security threats in an
IoT environment (Zeng et al., 2017; Malkin, Deatrick, Tong,
Wijesekera, Egelman and Wagner, 2019), where users are
found to trade their privacy for conveniences (Lau, Zimmerman and Schaub, 2018). In the landscape of privacy decisionmaking, people reported their interest to be notified about the
data practices of IoT device (Naeini et al., 2017), however,
the privacy notice often fails to help users with making an
informed decision to protect their privacy preferences while
purchasing or using an IoT device (Emami-Naeini et al., 2019).
The findings from these studies call for an investigation to
identify the gaps between people’s perceptions and the actual
data practices of IoT devices. We addressed this challenge
in our work1 , which is guided by the following research
enquiries:
• What are users’ perceptions of information collection by
IoT devices? How do their perceptions vary from the
actual data practices?
• What are users’ perceptions of information sharing (with
third-party entities) by IoT devices? How do their perceptions vary from the actual data practices?
• What are users’ perceptions of data storage / retention
period? How do their perceptions vary from the actual
data practices of IoT devices?
• What are users’ perceptions of data protection strategies
adopted by IoT devices? How do their perceptions vary
from the actual data practices?
To address these research questions, we selected 28 IoT
devices from different categories, including health & exercise,
entertainment, smart homes, toys & games, and pets, and
reviewed their privacy policies. We then conducted a lab study
with 42 participants, where they reported their perceptions of
data collection, sharing, storage period, and protection by IoT
devices. Our analysis identifies the gaps between participants’
1 This article is an extension of our paper (Al-Ameen, Chauhan, Ahsan
and Kocabas, 2020a), appeared in HAISA’20

perceptions and the actual data practices of IoT device. The
findings from this study would contribute towards the design
of simplified and usable privacy notice by highlighting the
unexpected data practices of users.

passive user adapts to device usage and rely on the smart home
driver to control functionality and fix technical issues of the
shared devices in a household (Geeng and Roesner, 2019).
The study of Page et al. (2018) unpacked the relation
between people’s perceptions and adoption of IoT technology.
The authors (Page et al., 2018) divided the IoT users into two
categories: “user-centric”, who think that the IoT devices are
to be controlled by users; and “agentic”, who perceive that
the control of IoT devices are to be negotiated between the
machine and human. The study (Page et al., 2018) highlighted
privacy concerns for the people coming from a user-centric
perspective given that consumer-oriented IoT is currently
moving towards the agentic view.
The prior studies (Malkin et al., 2019; Lau et al., 2018)
examined people’s privacy perceptions, concerns, and privacypreserving behaviors around smart speakers, where Malkin et
al. (2019) particularly focused on understanding user’s beliefs
and attitudes about the recordings that are made and shared by
smart speakers. The authors (Malkin et al., 2019) reported that
almost half of their participants who were users of Amazon
and Google smart speakers, did not know that their recordings
were being permanently stored by the devices. Due to such
unawareness, only a quarter of their participants reviewed
their recorded interactions, where very few had ever deleted
any recordings (Malkin et al., 2019). In a separate study,
Lau et al. (2018) found that the privacy concerns of smart
speaker users are impacted by different factors, including
their incomplete mental models of privacy vulnerabilities and
reliance on the socio-technical context in which a smart
speaker resides. The authors (Lau et al., 2018) identified that
users trade privacy for convenience with different levels of
deliberation and privacy resignation, where the privacy control
features of the smart speakers are rarely used because of their
incompatibility with people’s needs.
Users reported their interest to be notified about the data
practices of IoT device (Naeini et al., 2017). However, the
privacy notice often fails to help users with making an
informed decision to protect their privacy preferences while
purchasing or using an IoT device (Emami-Naeini et al.,
2019). As reported in the study of Emami-Naeini et al. (2019),
most of the participants did not consider the privacy and
security issues prior to purchasing an IoT device. However,
observing unexpected device behavior, and the knowledge
gathered from media reports and social discussion later made
them concerned about the security and privacy issues in an
IoT environment (Emami-Naeini et al., 2019).
The overall findings from these studies indicate that there
is a dearth in existing literature to understand the differences
between people’s perceptions and the actual data practices
of IoT devices. We addressed this gap in our work through
investigating users’ perceptions and comparing that with the
privacy policy of IoT devices from different categories.

II. R ELATED W ORK
To protect user’s digital privacy and security, the prior studies focused on studying the strategies of managing authentication secrets (Stobert and Biddle, 2018; Mayer and Volkamer,
2018; Kothari, Koppel, Blythe and Smith, 2017), investigating
user’s privacy needs and designing privacy-preserving technologies (Liu, Andersen, Schaub, Almuhimedi, Zhang, Sadeh,
Agarwal and Acquisti, 2016; Al-Ameen, Tamanna, Nandy,
Ahsan, Chandra and Ahmed, 2020b; Haque, Haque, Nandy,
Chandra, Al-Ameen, Guha and Ahmed, 2020) improving the
usability of security schemes (Al-Ameen and Wright, 2017;
Biddle, Chiasson and Van Oorschot, 2012; Al-Ameen, Fatema,
Wright and Scielzo, 2015), developing automated techniques
to detect unauthorized access to user’s accounts (King, Alhadidi and Cook, 2018), and building educational tools and
warning systems (Alsharnouby, Alaca and Chiasson, 2015;
Lastdrager, Gallardo, Hartel and Junger, 2017; Seng, AlAmeen and Wright, 2018). With the increasing use of IoT
devices, the research communities have started to focus on
identifying the security and privacy vulnerabilities of users in
an IoT environment, and developing usable technologies to
address these issues. In this section, we briefly discuss the
findings from recent studies on user’s privacy and security in
the landscape of Internet of Things (IoT).
The study of Naeini et al. (2017) investigated the privacy
preferences of users in different scenarios of IoT usage. This
vignette-based study (Naeini et al., 2017) reveals diverse
privacy preferences of users, which are related to the contexts
of using an IoT device. For instances, participants reported to
be less comfortable with data collection in private places as
compared to public settings, where they tend to allow data
collection based on their perceived benefits (Naeini et al.,
2017). The authors (Naeini et al., 2017) also found varying
preferences of users in terms of the type of data collected by
an IoT device, where participants reported less comfort with
the collection of biometrics information as compared to the
environmental data, e.g., room temperature.
The study of Zeng et al. (2017) examined the mental
models, security and privacy concerns, and mitigation strategies of users who live in a smart home equipped with IoT
devices. The findings from this study (Zeng et al., 2017)
reveal the incomplete threat models and ad hoc mitigation
strategies of users, influenced by their security practices for
older technologies. The authors (Zeng et al., 2017) argue that
the limited technical understanding of people often contributes
to their incorrect mental model of security threats in an IoT
environment. In a separate study, Geeng and Roesner (2019)
examined the interaction of people in a multi-user smart home,
where they found two categories of users for shared devices:
smart home driver and passive user. Here, a smart home driver
takes initiative to learn about and use smart devices, where a

III. M ETHODOLOGY
We conduced individual study session with each participant
in a lab setting. We recruited participants by sharing our study
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Device Category

Health & Exercise

Entertainment

IoT Devices

or debit card number), Health (height, weight, and work
out details), Location (current location: city level or more
precise), and Media (audio, and video). We also considered the
information about IoT device usage, and the information an
IoT device may collect from a connected device (e.g., contact
list from a smartphone) and from an online social media (e.g.,
friend list from Facebook).

Hidrate Spark 2.0 Water Bottle
Peloton Bike
Fitbit Charge 3 Fitness Tracker
Athena Safety Wearable
Samsung Gear Sport
Bose QuietComfort 35 II
Google Pixel Buds
PS4
Roku Streaming Players
Apple TV

Smart Homes

Sonos One
Mycroft Mark 1
Nest Learning Thermostat
Amazon Echo Dot
Amazon Cloud Cam
Behmor Brewer Coffee Maker
Philips Hue Smart Light Kit
SmartThings Outlet

Toys and Games

EVO Robot
Sphero Mini
DJI Spark Selfie Drone
CogniToys Dino
Dot Creativity Kit
Amazon Fire HD Kids Edition

Pets

Tractive 3GS Pet Tracker
Tile Mate
PetNet Smart Feeder
Petzi Treat Cam

C. Procedure
We conducted the study in a lab environment, where participants completed the survey hosted on Qualtrics2 after they
had read and agreed to informed consent document. Each
participant was presented with four IoT devices, selected in
a semi-random process from our list of 28 devices (each
IoT device was presented to six participants). For each IoT
device, the participant was presented with a visual description
about its functionality. Participants could take as much time
as they needed to familiarize themselves with the functionality
of the device. Thereafter, they reported their perceptions of
information collection and sharing by that device, where we
presented them with each type of information (see the above
paragraph for further details). Participants were also asked
about their perceptions of the reasons behind information
collection and sharing. Then, participants reported their perceptions of how long an IoT device keeps user’s information
stored, and security and privacy strategies (e.g., encryption,
anonymization) adopted by the device for data protection. For
each participant, the above process was repeated for three
other devices. At the end of study, participants answered a
set of demographic questionnaire. On average, each session
took around 45 minutes.

TABLE I
L IST OF I OT D EVICES S ELECTED FOR THE S TUDY

information through email and online social media. Our study
was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Utah
State University.

D. Analysis
We went through the privacy policy of each IoT device,
and compared that with participants’ perceptions in terms of
information collection, sharing, protection, and storage period.
There are four cases resulting from our comparison: a ‘YesYes’ match, a ‘No-No’ match, a ‘Yes-No’ mismatch, or a
‘No-Yes’ mismatch. Here, a ‘Yes-Yes’ match for information
collection means, the user believes that the information is
collected by a device and the privacy policy states that it is
indeed collected, where a ‘No-Yes’ mismatch represents, the
user thinks that the information is not collected by a device, but
that information is collected according to the device’s privacy
policy.

A. Selection of IoT Devices
We selected 28 devices for our study (see Table I) from the
list of IoT devices compiled by Mozilla Foundation1 , where
the devices are divided into different categories (e.g., health &
exercise, entertainment, smart homes, toys & games, and pets)
based on their core service and functionality. We conducted
a series of focus-group discussion among researchers in this
project and with our colleagues to finalize our device selection.
B. Types of Information
In light of prior work (Rao, Schaub, Sadeh, Acquisti and
Kang, 2016) and the privacy policy of selected devices, we
identified nine categories of information that are generally
collected by a device or service provider, where each type of
information is divided into sub-categories. For example, name,
gender, and date of birth of a user are collected as ‘personal
information’. The other types of information considered in
our study include: Contact (email address, postal address, and
phone number), Financial (bank account details, and credit

IV. R ESULTS
A. Participants
A total of 42 participants (16 females, 25 males, and 1
other), who live in Logan, Utah, took part in this study. The
age-range of our participants varied between 18 and 64, where
most (35, 83.3%) of them belonged to the age group 1834. Among our participants, 26 (61.9%) identified as White,
followed by Asian (16, 33.3%), Hispanic/Latino (1, 2.4%),

1 List of IoT Devices, compiled by Mozilla Foundation: https://mzl.la/
2zOK4II

2 Qualtrics is an online survey platform used to create, distribute, collect,
and analyze survey data (www.qualtrics.com)

3

Information Type
Personal

Contact

Financial

Health

Location

Media

Connected
Device
Online
Social Media
IoT Device
Usage

(Mis)Match
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes

Health & Exercise
74.74%
3.16%
9.47%
12.63%
79.76%
0.00%
0.00%
20.24%
20.00%
31.43%
20.00%
28.57%
42.03%
14.49%
28.99%
14.49%
96.43%
0.00%
0.00%
3.57%
14.29%
51.79%
12.50%
21.43%
16.22%
32.43%
32.43%
18.92%
15.79%
26.32%
5.26%
52.63%
92.59%
0.00%
0.00%
7.41%

Entertainment
56.30%
0.00%
0.00%
43.70%
54.17%
0.00%
0.00%
45.83%
27.16%
35.80%
16.05%
20.99%
0.00%
80.00%
20.00%
0.00%
63.41%
0.00%
0.00%
36.59%
29.41%
16.47%
25.88%
28.24%
35.71%
16.67%
19.05%
28.57%
33.33%
12.82%
10.26%
43.59%
69.05%
0.00%
0.00%
30.95%

Smart Homes
59.88%
0.00%
25.31%
14.81%
64.20%
0.00%
17.28%
18.52%
34.26%
20.37%
39.81%
5.56%
0.00%
77.08%
8.33%
14.58%
52.63%
14.04%
17.54%
15.79%
37.50%
33.33%
15.63%
13.54%
11.90%
45.24%
26.19%
16.67%
11.90%
59.52%
19.05%
9.52%
48.33%
11.67%
10.00%
30.00%

Toys & Games
77.78%
0.00%
0.00%
22.22%
61.11%
0.00%
0.00%
38.89%
35.19%
0.00%
0.00%
64.81%
*NA

Pets
50.00%
12.50%
12.50%
25.00%
91.67%
0.00%
0.00%
8.33%
4.17%
0.00%
0.00%
95.83%
*NA

73.33%
0.00%
20.00%
6.67%
51.67%
6.67%
13.33%
28.33%
*NA

58.33%
0.00%
0.00%
41.67%
20.83%
66.67%
8.33%
4.17%
*NA

50.00%
0.00%
0.00%
50.00%
68.75%
0.00%
0.00%
31.25%

0.00%
60.00%
0.00%
40.00%
45.83%
0.00%
0.00%
54.17%

TABLE II
M ATCH /M ISMATCH BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS ’ P ERCEPTIONS AND P RIVACY P OLICY: DATA C OLLECTION BY I OT D EVICES [*NA: I NFORMATION IS NOT
AVAILABLE IN PRIVACY POLICY ]

Fig. 2. Participants’ Perceptions of Data Sharing by IoT Devices
Fig. 1. Participants’ Perceptions of Data Collection by IoT Devices

were students. None of our participants had any academic or
professional background in cybersecurity.
Below, we report the findings from this study.

and Other (1, 2.4%). A majority (26, 61.9%) of participants
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Information Type
Personal

Contact

Financial

Health

Location

Media

Connected
Device
Online
Social Media
IoT Device
Usage

(Mis)Match
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes

Health & Exercise
1.11%
35.56%
57.78%
5.56%
3.33%
48.89%
37.78%
10.00%
1.67%
60.00%
10.00%
28.33%
0.00%
43.33%
56.67%
0.00%
0.00%
33.33%
66.67%
0.00%
0.00%
81.67%
18.33%
0.00%
0.00%
66.67%
33.33%
0.00%
0.00%
70.00%
30.00%
0.00%
0.00%
23.33%
76.67%
0.00%

Entertainment
26.98%
30.16%
22.22%
20.63%
24.60%
37.30%
15.08%
23.02%
8.33%
63.10%
15.48%
13.10%
0.00%
80.95%
19.05%
0.00%
19.61%
33.33%
31.37%
15.69%
4.76%
53.57%
25.00%
16.67%
7.14%
54.76%
23.81%
14.29%
4.76%
59.52%
19.05%
16.67%
42.86%
2.38%
11.90%
42.86%

Smart Homes
25.93%
18.52%
32.59%
22.96%
24.62%
26.15%
20.00%
29.23%
9.09%
42.86%
32.47%
15.58%
0.00%
88.57%
11.43%
0.00%
18.60%
32.56%
32.56%
16.28%
10.94%
53.13%
6.25%
29.69%
0.00%
83.33%
11.11%
5.56%
0.00%
80.56%
11.11%
8.33%
31.91%
29.79%
10.64%
27.66%

Toys & Games
56.48%
3.70%
12.96%
26.85%
34.26%
10.19%
6.48%
49.07%
7.14%
47.62%
9.52%
35.71%
*NA

Pets
23.53%
0.00%
23.53%
52.94%
22.58%
0.00%
22.58%
54.84%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%
*NA

15.38%
15.38%
61.54%
7.69%
12.96%
27.78%
27.78%
31.48%
*NA

12.00%
16.00%
20.00%
52.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
*NA

16.67%
0.00%
0.00%
83.33%
17.86%
14.29%
42.86%
25.00%

0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%
10.00%
0.00%
10.00%
80.00%

TABLE III
M ATCH /M ISMATCH BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS ’ P ERCEPTIONS AND P RIVACY P OLICY: DATA S HARING BY I OT D EVICES [*NA: I NFORMATION IS NOT
AVAILABLE IN PRIVACY POLICY ]

in terms information collection. From the perspective of user’s
privacy preservation, we consider a ‘No-Yes’ mismatch as the
most critical one, where users believe that the IoT device does
not collect an information, although it is actually collected by
that device. For instance, we found a ‘No-Yes’ mismatch in
95.83% of cases for the devices in “pets’ category in terms of
collecting financial information. Considering all data types,
we found most ‘No-Yes’ mismatch for the IoT devices in
“entertainment” and “pets” category, followed by the devices
in “toys & games”, “health & exercise” and “smart homes”.

B. Data Collection by IoT Devices
Figure 1 presents participants’ perceptions of data collection
by the IoT devices, where most of the participants perceive that
the IoT devices collect contact (91.07%), personal (86.31%),
location (82.74%), and device usage information (82.74%).
Participants’ perceptions of data collection are related to the
category of IoT devices. Considering all data types, IoT
devices in “pets” category are perceived to collect least amount
of information as compared to the devices in other categories,
where the “entertainment”-focused devices are perceived to
collect most amount of data from users. In some instances,
participants’ perceptions of collecting a specific type of information are related to the core service offered by the
device, where IoT devices in “Health & exercise” category
are perceived to collect more health information as compared
to the devices in other categories (see Figure 1).
Table II presents the matches and mismatches between
participants’ perceptions and the privacy policy of IoT devices

As we asked participants about the reasons of information
collection by an IoT device, in about half of the cases,
they reported that information collection is required for the
core functionality of a device. In around one-fourth of cases,
participants perceive that information collection is needed for
the organizations in IoT business to improve the functionality
of their device and offer personalized service to the customers.
Some participants believe that the business entities collect
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user information through their IoT devices for marketing, and
advertising their other products to the customers.
C. Data Sharing by IoT Devices
Figure 2 illustrates participants’ perceptions of data sharing
by the IoT devices. A majority of participants perceive that the
IoT devices share users’ personal (67.26%), contact (61.31%),
location (60.71%), and device usage (61.31%) information
with third-party entities. Participants’ perceptions of data
sharing are related to the category of IoT devices. Considering
all data types, IoT devices in “entertainment” category are
perceived to share most amount of user data, where the
participants perceive that the devices in “pets” category share
least amount of user information with other entities. We
also found that participants’ perceptions of sharing a specific
type of information varied across different categories of IoT
devices. For instances, the “entertainment”-focused devices are
perceived to share user’s personal information in above 80%
of cases, which is less than 30% for the devices in “pets”
category.
Table III presents the matches and mismatches between
participants’ perceptions and the privacy policy of IoT devices
in terms of information sharing, where a ‘No-Yes’ mismatch
is considered to be the most critical one from the perspective
of user’s privacy preservation (see §IV-B for further details).
Considering all data types3 , we found most ‘No-Yes’ mismatch
for the IoT devices in “pets” category, followed by the
devices in “toys & games”, “entertainment”, “smart homes”,
and “health & exercise”. Such mismatches also vary across
different categories of IoT devices with respect to information
type. For example, we found a 54.84% ‘No-Yes’ mismatch
for the devices in ‘pets’ category, which is 10% for “health &
exercise”-focused devices.
As we asked participants about the reasons of information
sharing (with third-party entities) by an IoT device, they mentioned about financial and business gain in about half of the
cases. One of our participants said, “I feel like most companies
share whatever they can, so that they can make money.” Some
participants perceive that information sharing with third-party
entities are required for improving the functionality of an IoT
device.

Fig. 3. Participants’ Perceptions of Data Storage by IoT Devices

Fig. 4. Participants’ Perceptions of Security and Privacy Features of IoT
Devices

IoT devices in “pets” category keep user’s information stored
for less than six months. Almost no participants perceive that
an IoT device stores user’s information for less than a day.
As we compared participants’ perceptions with the privacy
policy of IoT devices (see Table V in Appendix), we found
83.3% ‘No-Yes’ mismatch for “toys & games”-focused IoT
devices in terms of whether user’s information is stored
forever. That means, in 83.3% of cases, the IoT devices in
“toys & games” category store user’s information forever
although our participants do not perceive so. We found most
‘Yes-No’ mismatch for the IoT devices in “smart homes”
(58.33%) category, followed by the devices in “entertainment”
(47.62%) and “pets” (33.33%) category in terms of whether
user’s information is stored forever.
E. Security and Privacy Features of IoT Devices

D. Data Storage by IoT Devices

A majority of participants perceive that the IoT devices
in “toys & games”, “pets”, “entertainment”, and “health &
exercise” category encrypt user information in process of
communication and storage (see Figure 4). Here, the devices
in “toys & games” category are perceived by most of the
participants encrypting their information as compared to the
devices in other categories. As compared to other categories of
IoT devices, the ones in “smart homes” category are perceived
by the least number of participants offering security and
privacy features.
Table IV presents the matches and mismatches between
participants’ perceptions and the practices of IoT devices
in protecting user information. Here, we consider a ‘YesNo’ mismatch as the most critical one from the perspective

Figure 3 illustrates participants’ perceptions of how long an
IoT device stores the information collected from a user, where
80% of participants perceive that “entertainment”-focused IoT
devices store user’s information forever. The IoT devices in
“health & exercise” and “smart homes” category are perceived
to store user’s information forever by above 50% of participants. According to 30% of participants, “toys & games”focused IoT devices retain user’s information for less than
one year, where above one-third of participants perceive that
3 While considering all data types, the calculations of match and mismatch
present a lower limit for the devices in “toys & games” and “pets” category,
since some information are unavailable in their privacy policy (see ‘NA’ in
Table II and III)
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Security / Privacy Feature
Encrypts Information
Communicated
Encrypts Stored
Information
Anonymizes
Stored Information
Offers
’Do-not-Track’ Option

(Mis)Match
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes
Yes-Yes
No-No
Yes-No
No-Yes

Health & Exercise
53.33%
16.67%
23.33%
6.67%
20.00%
23.33%
56.67%
0.00%
0.00%
33.33%
66.67%
0.00%
3.33%
36.67%
43.33%
16.67%

Entertainment
45.24%
2.38%
11.90%
40.48%
47.62%
2.38%
11.90%
38.10%
11.90%
45.24%
40.48%
2.38%
19.05%
28.57%
14.29%
38.10%

Smart Homes
35.71%
10.71%
3.57%
50.00%
33.93%
8.93%
5.36%
51.79%
13.11%
39.34%
21.31%
26.23%
33.33%
16.67%
33.33%
16.67%

Toys & Games
73.33%
0.00%
20.00%
6.67%
60.00%
3.33%
16.67%
20.00%
*NA

Pets
77.78%
0.00%
0.00%
22.22%
*NA

*NA

*NA

*NA

TABLE IV
M ATCH /M ISMATCH BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS ’ P ERCEPTIONS AND P RIVACY P OLICY: S ECURITY AND P RIVACY F EATURES OF I OT D EVICES [*NA:
I NFORMATION IS NOT AVAILABLE IN PRIVACY POLICY ]

interest and motivation to learn about secure behavior, and fail
to take adequate steps to protect their information (Davinson
and Sillence, 2014; Naeini et al., 2017).

of user’s security and privacy preservation, where a user
believes that an IoT device adopts a secure strategy (e.g.,
encryption) for information protection, although it does not
adopt that strategy as noted in its privacy policy. For instance,
we found a ‘Yes-No’ mismatch in 56.67% of cases for the
devices in “health & exercise” category in terms of encrypting
user data during storage. That means, in above half of the
cases, participants had misconceptions about the secure storage
of their information by the devices in “health & exercise”
category. A majority of participants perceive that the devices
in “pets” category encrypt their information during storage
(see Figure 4), however, the privacy policy of these devices
do not mention about their security-preserving steps during
storage process. In these cases, we could not compare users’
perceptions with the privacy policy of IoT devices.

B. Unexpected Data Practices
The privacy notice often fails to help users with making an
informed privacy decision due to its excessive length, complicated language, or poor visualization (Mcdonald, Reeder, Kelley and Cranor, 2009; Gluck, Schaub, Friedman, Habib, Sadeh,
Cranor and Agarwal, 2016; Cate, 2010). As recommended in
prior studies (Schaub, Balebako, Durity and Cranor, 2015; Kelley, Cesca, Bresee and Cranor, 2010; Knijnenburg and Cherry,
2016), a privacy notice should preserve the simplicity, brevity,
and clarity in design for being understandable to general users.
Our findings unpack the misconceptions of users about the data
practices of IoT devices. The future research should build upon
these results, and conduct further studies if needed, to design
simplified privacy notice by highlighting the unexpected data
practices, so that users could focus on the privacy aspects
they are less informed about. We note that there is no ‘onesize-fits-all’ solution in this regard, as shown in our study
that users’ mismatched privacy perceptions vary across device
category and information type. So, we recommend to consider
each IoT device and information type individually, to identify
users’ privacy misconceptions and highlight unexpected data
practices in a privacy notice to help them with protecting
their privacy preferences. We also encourage to extend our
findings through further studies, in order to design usable and
effective training materials (e.g., videos, comics, infographics)
to raise the privacy awareness of people, where they should be
informed about privacy misconceptions and unexpected data
practices related to current technologies, including IoT.

V. D ISCUSSION
In this section, we shed light on the implications of our
findings, followed by a discussion on the the limitation of this
study.
A. Optimism Bias
Our study reveals the mismatches between users’ perceptions and the data practices stated in the privacy policy of
IoT devices. We identified the misconceptions of participants
that could potentially impact their privacy behavior. In many
cases, participants believe that their information, including
financial and health data are not collected by an IoT device,
although those information are collected and shared (with
third-party entities) by that device. Also, many participants
believe that IoT devices protect their information through
secure communication and storage, where we identified the
mismatches between users’ perceptions and actual practices.
Such misconceptions could contribute to users’ optimism
bias (Davinson and Sillence, 2014), where they consider the
risks of cyber attacks and information breach as ‘distant
harms’. As a result, they possess a false sense of security, lack

C. IoT Adoption
As shown in a recent study (Emami-Naeini et al., 2019),
users’ privacy perceptions of IoT technology could affect their
adoption and purchase behavior, where their perceptions are

7

rarely formed through the understanding of privacy policy.
So, the design of a simplified and usable privacy notice is
important not only for general users, but also for the organizations in IoT business; further emphasized by the findings from
our study. We identified instances where participants perceive
that a device collects and shares their information, although
according to its privacy policy, the device does not collect that
information (see ‘Yes-No’ mismatches in Table II and III). We
also found that some devices adopt data protection strategies,
like encrypting user’s information during communication and
storage, while the participants do not perceive, those devices
encrypt their information (see ‘No-Yes’ mismatches in Table
IV). In this context, a usable and simplified privacy notice
(see our recommendations in the above paragraph) would
provide users with better understanding of the steps taken
by organizations in IoT business to protect their customers’
privacy interests, which in turn, would contribute towards the
adoption of IoT devices by general users.

This study is conducted at a specific moment in time, and
user’s privacy perceptions and behaviors are ever evolving. So,
the privacy perceptions reported in this paper will continue
to shift over time. Despite this limitation, we believe that our
findings are useful as a lens to investigate the changes in user’s
privacy perceptions of IoT devices in future studies.
VI. C ONCLUSION
Our study provides valuable insights into the mismatches
between user’s perceptions and the privacy policy of IoT
devices in terms of data collection, sharing, protection, and
storage period. In our future work, we would extend the
findings from this study through the large-scale online survey,
and leverage our results towards the design of simplified and
usable privacy notice for IoT devices. We encourage Usable
Security, Privacy, and HCI research communities to extend the
findings of this work in the contexts of different domains and
field sites, and use other methods as well, if required.
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See next page.
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(Mis)Match

Health & Exercise

Entertainment

Smart Homes

Toys & Games

Pets

YES-YES
NO-NO
YES-NO
NO-YES

60.00%
0.00%
0.00%
40.00%

9.52%
38.10%
47.62%
4.76%

0.00%
41.67%
58.33%
0.00%

16.67%
0.00%
0.00%
83.33%

0.00%
66.67%
33.33%
0.00%

TABLE V
M ATCH /M ISMATCH BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS ’ P ERCEPTIONS AND P RIVACY P OLICY OF I OT D EVICES : DATA S TORAGE P ERIOD - ‘F OREVER ’
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